The self-concept is theorized to play an important role in many psychological processes. Numerous theories rest on assumptions concerning the differential accessibility of pieces of self-knowledge, but relatively little attention during the past decade has centered on examining the underlying structure of the self-concept that mediates such differences. In the present article, we suggest a new model of the self-concept that incorporates recent advances in knowledge regarding conceptual structure. We envision the self as a representation in working memory with inherently flexible content and organization. Initial empirical evidence supporting this view is reviewed and followed by a discussion of the implications of this model for many phenomena involving the self-concept.
knowledge of the cognitive structure of the self-concept per se (Banaji & Prentice, 1994) .
The ensuing lacuna has resulted in a problematic situation. Many theories that invoke the self-concept hinge on critical assumptions concerning the accessibilities and interrelations of specific pieces of self-knowledge, where accessibility is understood to mean the "activation potential of available knowledge" (Higgins, 1996, p. 134) . However, although theories implicating the self as a causal agent have progressed and proliferated, knowledge about the nature of the central mediating mechanism of these theories, the self-concept, has not evolved at an equivalent rate, making the structure of the self-concept something of a "black box." For example, present models of the self-concept either cannot readily explain well-documented self-related phenomena, such as the contextual malleability of the experience of self (e.g., McGuire & McGuire, 1988) , or remain agnostic with respect to the specific organization of self-information.
If, however, psychologists are to refine knowledge of the influence of the self-concept on social phenomena, we must continue to ask, as Kihlstrom (1993, p. 79) suggested, "What does the self look like?" It is only with a detailed model of the organization, or structure, of self-information in memory that predictive accuracy for charting changes in the accessibility of this information and, thereby, changes in individuals' experiences of self can increase (cf. Higgins et al., 1988) . Therefore, a clear grasp of the structure of the self-concept is necessary for examining any mediational hypotheses concerning self-knowledge; without such a model, it becomes increasingly difficult to explain how and why self-knowledge varies in activation.
In response to these concerns, we have been developing a new conception of the cognitive structure of the self-concept that both draws heavily on recent advances in concept structure research and integrates quite nicely, we believe, findings from this area with recent work from the self-concept literature (e.g., DeSteno & Salovey, 1997) . In the present article, we present a detailed discussion of this model. We begin with a brief review of previous models of self-concept structure and a discussion of their limitations in light of current research. We then describe our new conceptualization and delineate how we believe it successfully addresses such limitations and, in so doing, provides a general and quite flexible model for the selfconcept. We conclude with a review of initial empirical evidence supporting the unique predictions stemming from this model of the selfconcept and a discussion of its implications for many phenomena that involve self-knowledge.
What Form Shall the Self Take?
If the term self-concept is to be taken literally, then the structure of the self-concept should be consistent, in principle, with those of all other concepts stored in memory. Although the self, in all probability, is one of the most pivotal and elaborated concepts individuals possess, this status does not necessarily imply a unique representational form; to the contrary, repeated empirical examinations have shown the storage of self-knowledge in memory to be quite "ordinary" (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989, p. 41 ; see also, Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986) . Therefore, as Kihlstrom and his colleagues have noted (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994) , candidate models for the structure of the self-concept should most profitably be found among more general models of concept structure.
In examining the usefulness of such models, one important requirement must be kept in mind: the content of the self-concept, and therefore the experience of self, is malleable (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996; Markus & Wurf, 1987; McGuire & McGuire, 1988; McGuire, McGuire, & Cheever, 1986 ). This dynamism was clearly shown through an elegant series of studies by the McGuires (1988) wherein the accessibility of individuals' self-features was found to be responsive to the characteristics of their immediate social surroundings. More specifically, the McGuires found that feature accessibility varied as a function of relative distinctiveness; those self-features residing in memory that served to maximize the differentiation of individuals from those around them increased in accessibility. Thus, for example, a blue-eyed, dark-haired, Irish child may spontaneously describe herself as Irish and dark-haired in the presence of Scandinavian children, but, in accord with the distinctiveness principle, would likely pair the features blue eyes and Irish in the presence of Asian children. Markus and Kunda (1986) presented additional evidence supporting a dynamic model of the self-concept through demonstrating that the accessibility of self-features is responsive to situationally induced motivations. For instance, they found that individuals who were made to feel exceedingly different from or exceedingly similar to their peers attempted to compensate by making more accessible the self-features that opposed their manipulated social categorizations. These findings led Markus and her colleagues to develop the notion of a "working self-concept" that consists of an individual's set of currently active self-features (Markus & Wurf, 1987) . As its name suggests, the working self-concept provides an analog to working memory; it holds only a subset of one's stored self-information and, thereby, can explain malleability of the self-concept through alterations in the contents of the active subset. The working self-concept, as currently specified, does possess one major shortcoming, however; it is silent with respect to structure. It does not specify any particular organizational scheme for active self-features, and, consequently, is not acceptable as a model for the structure of the self-concept (cf. Barsalou, 1993; Higgins et al., 1988; Medin, 1989) . The empirical support for a dynamic self-concept does, however, point to the importance of flexibility in this structure, and any complete model of the self-concept, therefore, must be able to accommodate such flexibility.
Traditional Models of the Self-Concept
Many investigators have held that models of the self-concept should mirror more general models of concept structure. For example, as a consequence of the apparent use of prototype models in the 1970s (e.g., Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) , Rogers (1981) suggested that the self should be conceived of as a summary description of its features. However, prototype models of the self-concept, and of concepts in general, have been shown to be somewhat problematic for a number of reasons. As noted by Kihlstrom and Klein (1994) , prototypes are designed to provide a probabilistic view of the central tendency of a class of objects; if there is only one instance of this class (i.e., the self), then "of what is the self-concept a prototype" (Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994, p. 161) ? Even more troublesome, though, are the critiques leveled against prototype models in general (e.g., Barsalou, 1993; Medin, 1989; Medin & Schaffer, 1978) . For example, Medin and his colleagues have shown that individuals use both information regarding the variability of features among class members and feature covariation information in determining categorization (Medin, 1989; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Murphy & Medin, 1985) ; neither type of information is available from prototype models of concept structure. A final complication involves the situational malleability of the self-concept; explaining such context-sensitive flexibility from a prototype model proves exceedingly difficult (cf. Barsalou, 1993) .
In order to address the shortcomings of prototype models, many researchers have developed exemplar models of concept structure and categorization (e.g., Medin& Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1987; Smith & Zfirate, 1992) . In contrast to the abstracted summary information posited to compose prototypes, exemplar models consist of discrete instances of class members stored in memory. In the case of person categories, of which the self is one, these representations, or exemplars, may vary greatly in their level of detail. Some may contain only minimal information (e.g., one or two attributes), whereas others may encode all information relevant to a specific event (e.g., perceptual attributes and information relevant to the perceiver's expectations, attributions, and inferences; Smith & Zfirate, 1992) . Consequently, exemplar models provide a clear way to represent information regarding feature variability and covariation; an examination of instances of any concept allows quick computation concerning these characteristics (Smith &Medin, 1981) . Exemplar models can also readily account for the malleability of the self-concept; the exact composition of an individual's set of active self features, and therefore her or his experience of self, depends on which specific instances are active in working memory.
On the basis of the benefits afforded by exemplar models, they appear to hold promise as candidates for representing the self-concept. Indeed, several exemplar models of the structure of the self-concept have been proposed, each dictating that knowledge of one's traits consists of a series of episodic memory traces involving autobiographical events (e.g., Bellezza, 1984; Bower & Gilligan, 1979) . Recently, however, important challenges to the pure exemplar view have been raised, both with respect to models of the self-concept (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; and to models of concept structure in general (Medin, 1989; Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984) .
The primary objection to pure exemplar models is that it is difficult to believe that individuals do not retain summary information of any kind in memory. With respect to the self-concept, the work of buttresses this view. They have clearly demonstrated that individuals' self-concepts consist of both summary and episodic selfknowledge. Even more important, their research has also shown that each type of information is independently stored, and, therefore, individual bits of semantic and episodic self-information are able to serve as distinct features of the self-concept (cf. Hastie, 1988) . These findings have lead Klein and his colleagues to propose a dual exemplar-summary model of the self Klein, Loftus, & Sherman, 1993) , thereby combining the best features of both types of models. Importantly, empirical support for such dual models extends beyond the realm of the self-concept (e.g., Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984) ; dual exemplarsummary models have evidenced usefulness in explaining the structure of person concepts (Carlston & Skowronski, 1986) and stereotypes (Sherman, 1996) .
As attractive a candidate as a dual exemplarsummary model may be for the structure of the self-concept, recent work suggests that it, like all its predecessors, may not provide a complete picture. As Medin (1989) and others (e.g., Barsalou, 1993) have noted, prototype, exemplar, and dual models of concept structure rest on assumptions of a fixed similarity among features. That is, underlying all these models is an assumption that feature associations are invariant across contexts. Moreover, these models have difficulty explaining the differential attention given to certain sets of features in categorization judgments, as well as how and why these different sets cohere into meaningful concepts (Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985) . Thus, although a dual exemplarsummary model provides information regarding the types of features that may reside in the self-concept, it neither explains their interrelations nor the responsivity of these relations to differential contexts. Given that the selfconcept, like most other concepts (Barsalou, 1993) , is flexible, and that knowledge activation is context sensitive (Higgins, 1996) , the question remains: What controls the differential accessibility of features in the working selfconcept and also allows these features to cohere in a meaningful way? There must be a "glue" that binds these features together (Murphy & Medin, 1985) ; if not, consciousness would be awash in the myriad features composing the self and other complex concepts (cf. Smith & Z~ate, 1992; Medin, 1989) . Therefore, if the self-concept is a cognitive structure, its semantic and episodic features must be related in a coherent, hut flexible, way (cf. Higgins et al., 1988; Kihlstrom, 1993; Markus, 1977; Medin, 1989; Smith & Zfirate, 1992) .
Schemas, Frames, and Theories
Throughout the past decade, the idea that concepts must consist of more than feature lists has become increasingly popular (Medin, 1989) . If this were not the case, categorization, especially of complex social concepts, would be intractable (Barsalou, 1993; Murphy & Medin, 1985) . In order to understand why this is so, one must consider two points: the unconstrained nature of similarity and the need for frames or theories of concept-specific feature associations and feature importance.
To appreciate the flexible nature of similarity, consider the following example. Is the color gray more similar to the color white or black? The answer, it appears, depends heavily on the context (Medin, 1989) . In conducting a series of studies examining the inherent flexibility in feature similarities, Medin and Shoben (1988) found that gray clouds were judged to be more similar to black clouds than to white clouds, but gray hair was perceived as more similar to white hair than to black hair. As another example, they also found that gold coins were judged to be more similar to silver than to brass coins, but gold railings were thought to be more similar to brass than to silver railings. In each case, if similarity were indeed absolute, such asymmetries should not have been found. If the three stimuli in each of the two sets (e.g., clouds and hair) differed only on the dimension of color, then the corresponding pairs of colored stimuli should have been judged most similar within both sets, for in computing the similarity of objects, any gray object should differ by some fixed quantities from any respective white and black objects, all other features being equal. That is, gray clouds should have been judged as most similar to black clouds, and gray hair as most similar to black hair if similarity were absolute. However, because such symmetrical results were not obtained, a flexible model of similarity appears appropriate. Indeed, earlier work by Tversky and his colleagues stressed the need for a flexible model of perceived similarity by showing that the similarity between two objects may vary greatly depending both on which dimension(s) is (are) used for comparison and the importance given to that dimension for categorization (Gati & Tversky, 1984; Tversky, 1977) .
In order to make similarity useful for purposes of categorization, it must be constrained. To return to the cloud and hair example, Medin and Shoben (1988) argued that the asymmetries of the effect of color on the perceived similarities of the two types of stimuli were due to the theories that individuals held in regard to meteorology and aging. This is, gray clouds were judged more similar to black clouds because both imply rain, but gray hair was perceived as more similar to white hair because both ate signs of advancing age. Correspondingly, the asymmetry in the coin and railing example can be explained by contrasting individuals' intuitive knowledge of the financial worth of metals and their perceptions of superficial hues; when judging the similarity of coins, individuals constrained similarity to the pecuniary dimension.
Increasingly, recent categorization models have recognized the need for context-dependent similarity. For example, Nosofsky's (1987) generalized context model incorporates differential dimension weightings in determining the similarity among objects, thereby allowing for individual or situational variation in the criteria used to determine similarity. Smith and ZSxate (1992) have adapted this model successfully for social categorization and postulate many influences (e.g., past history, motivation, situational cueing) that jointly determine the dimensions used to judge the similarities, and therefore categorizations, of individuals.
The second primary problem of prototype and exemplar models of concept structure concerns their lack of ability to specify relations among features; there is ample evidence that concepts contain not only information concerning the intercorrelation of their features but also some principles that determine the features and covariations that are noticed (Medin, 1989) . Without the incorporation of such principles, any two objects could be arbitrarily similar. To illustrate this point, Murphy and Medin (1985) suggest the example of plums and lawn mowers: "Both weigh less than 10,000 kg .... both cannot hear well, both can be dropped, both take up space, and so on" (p. 292). When confronted with a categorization judgment, individuals are left to struggle with the question of which features are of note and what should their interrelations be? Without guidance concerning the important feature intercorrelations, categorization is exceedingly difficult. This is especially the case with complex social concepts (e.g., humans) whose features (e.g., skin color) have attached to them varying levels of importance and types of associations depending on social and cultural factors; some guiding principles must determine the coherence and meaningful interrelations of such attributes and address, even if only implicitly, the issue of the differential importance of certain dimensions (e.g., skin color, gender, sexual orientation) for purposes of categorization (Smith & Z~rate, 1992) . Any model of concept structure, then, must be able both to account for contextual variability in constraining the dimensions used to judge similarity and to provide guiding principles to determine which features, and covariations among features, are salient for specific concepts. Prototype, exemplar, and dual exemplarsummary models cannot satisfy these requirements (Barsalou, 1993; Medin, 1989; Medin& Wattenmaker, 1987) ; some other type of information must be included in a concept's representation if the relevant features are to cohere in a meaningful way (cf. Smith, 1990) .
To satisfy these requirements, Medin and his colleagues have proposed the theory-based model of concept structure (Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985) . Theory-based models do not represent a dramatic alteration in conceptual representation; rather, they are intended to enhance current models by advancing knowledge of the principles that hold concepts together (Murphy & Medin, 1985) . These models still make use of similarity among features for determining categorization, but also include underlying principles (i.e., theories) that constrain similarity and guide feature covariation and salience. According to the theory-based view, concepts not only consist of features, but also consist of information dictating how and why these features should be interrelated (Medin, 1989) . This information is experientially derived and meaningful; it provides individuals with explanations of why certain features are or are not associated, and with principles dictating both how features covary and which dimensions of similarity are more or less important for categorization.
For instance, in most mammalian sexually dimorphic species, largeness is associated with being male; this relation is reversed, however, for many insect species (e.g., praying mantis), and incorporating this information into the appropriate conceptual structures allows correct categorizations to be made. In addition, theorybased models can easily explain why similarity perceptions and categorizations of certain objects change as knowledge about them increases. Keil (1987) , for example, has shown that at a certain age, biological theory replaces perceptual features in guiding children's judgments of animal categorization. Thus, for example, whales come to be considered mammals, even though they more superficially resemble fish. This same reasoning explains why experts in many fields organize conceptual features differently than novices (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973) ; they possess knowledge of some underlying concept-relevant theory that the less familiar do not, which results in differential categorization judgments of the same stimuli. Theories, then, increase the usefulness of similarity in concept formation by allowing it to be constrained to certain weighted dimensions; they act to organize features in a meaningful way and provide guidance concerning dimension salience for categorization (Medin, 1989) . But the question remains, what constitutes a theory? Murphy and Medin (1985) noted that a theory, in their usage of the term, can be any type of simple, mental explanation; it does not need to be a complete, scientific framework:
causal knowledge certainly embodies a theory of certain phenomena; scripts may contain implicit theory of the entailment relations between mundane events; knowledge of rules embodies a theory of the relations between rule constituents; and book-learned, scientific knowledge certainly contains theories." (p. 290) They acknowledged, moreover, that some theories may be implicit; individuals may perceive associations among objects although they are unsure or unable to specify exactly why. Although it may appear somewhat tenuous to call all such cases theories, the term, as used by Medin and colleagues, simply implies a complex set of relations among objects, usually with some type of causal basis (Murphy & Medin, 1985) . Barsalou (1993) advocated a similar view of concept structure. In advancing what he terms frame theory, he pointed to the inability of exemplar and prototype models to account both for differentially weighted relations and concept decomposition, or recursion. He argued, therefore, that conceptual representation must be in the form of frames, which he equated with schemas. The frames act to organize a concept's features in a meaningful way and provide information concerning their differential importance and interrelations. Thus, in general, there appears to be a growing consensus that concepts are organized according to some underlying principles, whether termed schemas, frames, or theories.
Schemas, Frames, and Theories of Self
The notion that conceptual knowledge must be organized according to some underlying principles that guide expectations and interpretations is not new in the social psychological study of person perception and the self. Consequently, theory-based, or frame-based, concept models do not represent a radical alteration in how the self has been studied; rather, they are anticipated in much of the relevant research. For example, the problem of trait structure has occupied personality theorists for decades. Asch's (1946) seminal work on the problem of person perception sought to understand how individuals form impressions of others. One of his primary findings concerned the influence of what he termed central traits on impression formation. Asch showed that the presence of certain central traits (e.g., warm or cold) in a target person influenced the perceptions of other traits applied to this person (see also Wishner, 1960) . Such findings necessarily implied that individuals possessed some theory concerning the meanings and covariations among traits. Asch (1946) , himself, noted that person perception involved grasping a particular trait structure; in the representation of each person, he argued, one "perceived not this and that quality, but the two entering into a particular relation" (p. 284). Bruner and Tagiuri (1954) , in examining this issue, argued that each person possesses an implicit theory of personality that guides impressions of others and, therefore, the traits ascribed to them. In a similar vein, Rosenberg, Nelson, and Vivekananthan (1968) conducted an elegant study concerning the structure of personality impressions that attempted to uncover the implicit dimensions used to organize trait information. Through measuring individuals' perceptions of the similarity, or cooccurrence, of traits in persons and submitting these data to a multidimensional scaling analysis, they found that the similarity of traits could be described based on their relevance to two general dimensions: intellectual ability and social desirability. From a theory-based view of concept structure, these criteria could be thought of as the dimensions on which trait associations are determined.
In some of the earliest work on the structure of the self-concept, Kelly (1955) noted that a fundamental task of understanding mental representations (i.e., concepts or constructs) is to discover idiographic differences in how stimuli are perceived to be similar. Kelly's notion of a construct "is that it is a way in which two or more elements are judged to be alike" (p. 305); however, without knowing what this way is, there are "no grounds for construing similarity" (p. 305). Constructs, according to Kelly, channeled information processing and were built, much like theories, from experience of the perceived covariation among objects. Kelly's (1955) Role Construct Repertory test was designed to uncover the dimensions used to organize self-information with respect to the different roles of individuals, and as such, could be considered a precursor to the theory-based, or frame-based, study of the self. Similarly, Epstein (1973) has emphasized the importance of the idiosyncratic structuring and interpretation of self-relevant information in studying the self-concept; he has argued for viewing the self-concept as a theory that each individual constructs concerning his identity, attributes, and desires.
The notion of self-schemas put forward by Markus and her colleagues also suggests a theoretical organization of self-information. For example, Markus and Smith (1981) described self-schemas as "generalizations or theories about the self, developed from the repeated similar categorization and evaluation of behavior by oneself and others, that result in a clearly differentiated idea of the kind of person one is with respect to a particular domain of behavior" (p. 240). As Markus has repeatedly shown, individuals possess differing schemas related to such disparate issues as motivational orientation, gender, and weight (Markus, 1977; Markus, Crane, Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982; Markus & Wurf, 1987) .
As Markus and Zajonc (1985) noted that the majority of social psychologists who have used the term schemas conceive of them as "subjective 'theories' about how the social world operates" (p. 145), we see little difference between these two terms (theory and schema) in the case of concept structure; they each indicate a set of knowledge that guides attention to salient dimensions and allows predictions for different types of feature interrelations. Additionally, Barsalou (1993) considers his notion of a frame to be equivalent with a schema. Consequently, we continue to use these terms interchangeably.
Upon reflection, it appears that the concept structure and self-concept literatures are iterating closer to a consensus of what the self "looks like." However, to date, none of the proffered models of the self-concept are able to accommodate readily the malleability of both the contents and the structure of self-knowledge in working memory. The working self-concept proposed by Markus and Wurf (1987) is an excellent starting point for such a model, but, as previously noted, is silent with respect to the flexible organizational structure of self-features that must accompany alterations in the sets of active features (cf., Barsalou, 1993; Medin, 1989) . Some underlying theory or schema, the uniqueness of the self for example, must be at work forging conceptual coherence and guiding perceived trait associations; why else, to return to an earlier example, would the self-feature of Irish sometimes come into awareness with the feature dark-hair, and other times with the feature blue-eyes when an individual possessing all three features reflects on him-or herself (cf. McGuire & McGuire, 1988) ?
The Flexible Structure of the Self-Concept
What Does the Self Look Like ?
Given that a concept must have some underlying organizational principles, theorybased, or schema-based, models provide promising candidates for conceptual structure. Concepts, however, also exhibit a good deal of flexibility across contexts (Barsalou, 1982 (Barsalou, , 1987 (Barsalou, , 1993 . How is this dynamism to be integrated into a model for the self-concept? The answer, we believe, is provided by a recent model of concept structure proposed by Barsalou (1993) . Barsalou (1993) defined a concept as "a temporary construction in working memory, derived from a larger body of knowledge in long-term memory to represent a category..." (p. 29). A concept for any given category, therefore, may change across contexts through the use of different knowledge from long-term memory (Barsalou, 1982 (Barsalou, , 1993 . "For example," Barsalou (1993) noted, "the concept that someone's constructs for raccoons on one occasion might in part include the features furry, white stripes, and playful whereas the concept constructed on another occasion might include the features furry, nocturnal and scavenger" (p.
29). Thus, concepts may be conceived of as an individual's cognitive representation of a category on a specific occasion and, consequently, will be expected to show both an inter-and intra-individual variability. The ability of this view of concepts to accommodate the malleability of the selfconcept is readily apparent. The contextsensitive flexibility of the contents of the self-concept (e.g., Hinkley & Andersen, 1996; McGuire & McGuire, 1988) , the differential activations of features such as Irish, dark hair, and blue eyes, for example, parallels quite nicely the above example of flexibility of the concept raccoon. This dynamism, however, is not random; the working self-concept is not simply a subset of self-features activated by chance (Markus & Wurf, 1987; McGuire & McGuire, 1988) . Therefore, questions about how the specific subsets of features are formed remain. Barsalou (1993) noted that in addition to being flexible, concepts are structured, implying that the relations among their features must be specified (Barsalou, 1993; Medin, 1989) . Guidance concerning the important feature relations and covariations is provided by the schemas, frames, or theories held by individuals regarding the concept in question. These schemas, as one would imagine, also evidence both inter-and intra-individual variability in use, thereby affecting the associations and accessibilities among features in the working self-concept.
This notion is supported by findings demonstrafing context-specificity in recall (Tulving & Thomson, 1973 ). An example from a study by Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrell, and Nitsch (1974) illustrates the point. Participants in this study were presented with the word piano either in the context of music production or furniture moving. Subsequent cues relevant to music functioned as the optimal retrieval cues for the word piano for those who encoded it in a musical context, but cues regarding the weight of pianos functioned as optimal retrieval cues for those who encoded piano in the context of moving furniture. Further support was provided by Barsalou (1982) who showed that features of a concept that are relevant to a specific context are much more accessible in the presence of that context than in a neutral context. Additionally, Higgins (1996) has argued for the importance of considering the applicability of knowledge with regard to charting its activation, where applicability refers to the context-specific associations, or similarities, among attended features. To the extent that stored knowledge is perceived as similar to activated knowledge, its probability of activation will increase (Higgins, 1996) .
Following the logic of theory-based (Medin, 1989) and frame-based (Barsalou, 1993) concept models, these findings make perfect sense; schemas, frames, and theories influence the contents of working memory by determining the accessibilities of, applicabilities of, and interrelations among conceptual features. Thus, one may use differing schemas regarding the same concept at different times, resulting in a different set of active features and a different representational structure of these features for a specific concept in working memory (Barsalou, 1993) . This flexible organization allows concepts to be both malleable and structured.
We believe, therefore, that the self-concept, much like other concepts, may profitably be viewed as a representation in working memory consisting of an organized set of episodic and semantic self-features whose feature associations, or structure, are determined by the currently active frame(s). This perspective, we feel, makes great sense, for when people reflect on the self, it is usually with reference to a specific context. For instance, each of us, if asked, could provide a label, or multiple labels, for who we are and how we think of ourselves. Individuals regularly refer to themselves as African Americans, conservative Christians, and/or environmental activists, to name just a few categories. Each of these labels has associated with it beliefs about what such types of people are and are not. Moreover, it seems probable that these beliefs act as frames or schemas that guide the organization of and attention to certain types of self-relevant information; they may be considered theories of self dictating the defining covariations of one's features. Although most individuals in these categories live on earth, have lungs and a heart, have a pink tongue and ten fingers, when asked who they are, they will probably ignore these features in deference to ones concerning their one or more primary theories of self (e.g., occupation, avocation, social group). Such constellations of specific descriptors represent a highly selective subset of self-information which, we believe, is made accessible according to an individual's self-schema (cf. Higgins, 1996; Medin, 1989) . A more accurate concrete example may be illustrated with the McGuires' (1988) findings conceming differences in the spontaneous selfconcept. If individuals hold a theory that the self is unique, then the association of their self-features should be at least partially determined with respect to the dimension of distinctiveness. To reiterate, the McGuires (1988) found that the most accessible features of the self were ones that differentiated oneself from others. That is, the association of these features in awareness with respect to self was determined according to their chronic or acute distinctiveness, and it was this criteria that served to bind these elements together to form the working self-concept. Such featural interrelations must be flexible, for the set of features that makes one distinct in certain environments surely will differ in others. Consequently, the associations among these features in working memory should be dynamic.
As noted, theories, frames, or schemas act to organize self-information and thereby determine both the accessibilities of and interrelations among self-features. They determine the basic organizational criteria used for categorization, and therefore, activation of a self-schema is hypothesized both to increase the accessibility of relevant self-information and to organize this information into a meaningful concept. Suppose, for instance, that an individual holds a schema of herself as a successful athlete. According to this view of self-concept structure, the perceived associations of features in her self-concept would be determined with respect to their athletic relevance. As an example, if the features dedicated, muscular, and studious are stored in her self-concept, the feature pair dedicated and muscular should be seen as more related (i.e., more likely to co-occur) than either of the two feature pairs incorporating studious. Moreover, activation of either dedicated or muscular should increase the accessibility of the other so long as the athleticism self-schema is active, the schema's activation having already increased the baseline accessibilities of these items (cf. Barsalou, 1993; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966) . Therefore, the proportion of athletically relevant self-information in the working selfconcept should be large and show a greater amount of organization, or association, than other self-information. However, an individual with an academic self-theory would be expected to show a different pattern of trait associations. For this individual, dedicated would most likely be associated with studious because academic relevance would serve as the primary organizational dimension.
In this model, malleability of the self-concept is simply explained by a change in schema dominance. Most individuals possess several roles in life (e.g., professional, interpersonal) and, therefore, may regularly think of themselves in terms of the different roles they play. For example, individuals may reflect on themselves as doctors, siblings, athletes, or members of marginalized groups. As schemas concerning these labels (i.e., beliefs about the interrelations of their defining characteristics) become salient, they act, we believe, to reorganize the structure of the working self-concept. In accord with research demonstrating both the influence of construct accessibility and applicability on information processing (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977) and temporal fluctuations in the dominance of accessible constructs (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988) , we assert that selfschemas exert their influence in a similar fashion. Self-information relevant to the currently predominant schema gains in accessibility, and the associations among pieces of this information alter to reflect the constraining of similarity, or association, to this dominant dimension (cf. Smith & Z~ate, 1992) ; the self-concept, in essence, is viewed in terms of the currently accessible theoretical construct. It is also important to note that conscious awareness of alterations in the dominant schema or theory is not necessary; schemas may influence the content and structure of the self-concept implicitly through differentially weighting feature associations (cf. Barsalou, 1993; Murphy & Medin, 1985) .
The flexible model of the self-concept that we are proposing appears able to accommodate quite readily much of the current findings regarding self-concept malleability. Viewing the self-concept as a set of features active in working memory whose associations are determined with respect to one or more schemas or frames that also vary in activation provides a new perspective from which to study the functioning of the self-concept that possesses the added benefit of not reducing representational parsimony by requiring a distinct form of representation for the self-concept. Moreover, in addition to being consistent with most empirically verified predictions stemming from previous models of the self-concept, our flexible model makes several unique predictions regarding self-knowledge.
Before turning to a discussion of these predictions, a word about the mechanisms underlying such a flexible model is warranted. The contextual flexibility of feature relations is difficult, but not impossible, to explain with symbolic models of memory; connectionist models, however, provide a much more facile system for modeling such dynamism (Barsalou, 1993; Clark, 1993; Rumelhart, McClelland, & The PDP Research Group, 1986; Smith, 1996) . As Barsalou (1993) noted, "The basic learning mechanisms of connectionist models are acutely sensitive to the statistical properties of information, such that they can account for the effects of frequency, recency, and context on accessibility" (pp. 35-36) .
A basic tenet of most connectionist models is that the weights controlling the flow of activation are shaped through learning the associations of different stimuli, or features (McClelland, Rumelhart, & The PDP Research Group, 1986) . Importantly, however, these features are not stored statically in memory, but rather are reconstructed in accord with current activation flows. Consequently, as the flow of activation is altered by other inputs (e.g., individuals' motivations, perceptions of stimuli from the social environment) or by the iteration of connection weights in response to new pairings of features (i.e., a recency effect), different output features may result from similar input features and, thereby, result in flexible feature associations (Barsalou, 1993; Clark, 1993 , Rumelhart et al., 1986 Smith, 1996) . Context may simply be one of many sources of information that influence connection weights, and, therefore, it is as easily incorporated into these models as is any other type of information.
Model Predictions
The first prediction stemming from the flexible structure model of the self-concept concerns the chronic levels of accessibility and organization of individuals' self-features. More specifically, we expect features relevant to different schemas or frames to show differential levels of accessibility and organization in the working self-concept as an increasing monotonic function of schema dominance. That is, features relevant to the dominant schema should tend, on average, to be most accessible and should be more tightly organized (i.e., more highly associated) in working memory than other types of features. Variability in the relative dominance of schemas can be understood as a function of construct accessibility; depending on idiographic experiences and cultural ethos, individuals will chronically favor certain schemas for determining feature organization (cf. Higgins, 1996; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Medin, 1989; Smith & Z~ate, 1992) . However, alternate frames or schemas could temporarily increase in dominance as a function of situational cueing, thereby altering the content and form of the working self-concept.
This schema flexibility leads to a second unique prediction: The organization of different types of features in the working self-concept should be dynamic. That is, as schemas vary in relative dominance, so will the level of organization among their relevant features. Thus, if a schema concerning the characteristics of one's ethnic group's members increases in dominance, many self-feature associations will be determined with respect to knowledge and expections concerning members of this group, and the level of organization of these relevant features will also increase. Phenomenologically, greater organization among certain types of features implies that activation of any member of this class of features increases the likelihood of activation of related features. Therefore, features related to the current schema should predominate in awareness (cf. Higgins, 1996; Higgins et al., 1988; Showers, 1992) . A third prediction concerns comparisons of the self to others. Much as Smith and Z~ate (1992) have argued that person categorization depends on the dimensions to which individuals attend, we expect that judgments of the similarity of self to others, and therefore social categorization judgments of self, should predominantly depend upon criteria relevant to individuals' active schemas. For example, whether an Asian physician perceives herself to be more similar to an Asian lawyer or to a Caucasian doctor depends on the relative levels of importance of an ethnicity schema and a professional schema for her self-concept (cf. Smith & ZS_rate, 1992) .
Initial Empirical Support for a Flexible
Structure Model of the Self-Concept
In this section, we review three experiments designed to examine the first two predictions derived from the flexible structure model of the self-concept. The first experiment examined chronic individual differences in the content and organizational form of individuals' working self-concepts. The second experiment was designed to be both a replication and extension of the first. In addition to examining chronic idiographic differences, it also tested the prediction that the structure of self-features is responsive to situational cues. The third experiment focused on participants' emotional states as a contextual factor that influences selfconcept structure. Given that past research has suggested that the organization of serf-information influences emotional states (LinviUe, 1985; Segal, 1988; Showers, 1992; Showers & Kling, 1996) , we had intended to see if this relation was bidirectional.
Chronic Differences in the Structure of the Self-Concept
The first prediction derived from the flexible structure model of the self-concept dictates that individuals should evidence differing levels of accessibility and organization of distinct types of self-features as a function of their chronically dominant schemas or frames. In order to examine this prediction empirically, we first selected two schematic orientations that are broadly distributed among the general population. In accord with the large corpus of personality research indicating that two important, global motives concern achievement and affiliation themes (e.g., Anderson, Reznik, & Cben, 1997; Blatt & Blass, 1992; Cantor, 1994; McAdams, 1985; McClelland, 1984) , we chose to examine individuals who were schematic on one or the other of these dimensions; much research, after all, has shown that motivational orientations influence schematicity and the self-concept (Andersen, Reznik, & Chen, 1997; Higgins, 1990; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982; Markus, 1977; Markus & Kunda, 1986) .
We expected that individuals high in one motive, but low in the other, would show accessibility and organizational differences for achievement-and affiliation-relevant features in their respective self-concepts. For example, because an achievement schema would both guide attention to achievement-relevant selffeatures and act as a criterion for determining interfeature associations, individuals who possessed a dominant achievement schema should show both a greater accessibility and organization of achievement-relevant self-features in comparison to affiliation-relevant ones.
To test this hypothesis, we first identified a set of individuals who possessed either high levels of achievement and low levels of affiliation motivation, or the reverse pattern, as indexed by their scores on the achievement and affiliation subscales of the Jackson Personality Research Form (Jackson, 1984) ; these groups are hereafter referred to as the achievement and affiliation groups, respectively. To provide indices of feature accessibility and an implicit measure of feature organization, we used a paradigm very similar to the one used by McGuire and McGuire (1988) to study the contents of the spontaneous self-concept. Participants were given 3 minutes to describe themselves by listing any type of self-descriptors that came to mind; some examples of the types of descriptors generated were the following: self-conscious, meticulous, short, Italian American, lied for my boyfriend, anal-retentive, and sensitive. An important benefit of the idiographic nature of this task is that it allowed us to sample the actual contents of individuals' working self-concepts.
On completing the generation of descriptors, participants labeled their descriptors as indicating one of several categories (e.g., achievement relevant, affiliation relevant, factual, emotional). In this way, each participant was allowed to determine the dimensional relevance of his or her descriptors. Such an approach is quite necessary because the dimension of relevance for many descriptors may vary dramatically among individuals. For instance, the descriptor intelligent may be related to achievement concerns for some, but also may indicate social skills or desirability for others. Consequently, we felt that participants' idiographic categorizations of their self-features served as a more reliable classification scheme than would a nomothetic system. Using responses to this self-description task, we examined our prediction concerning differential feature accessibilities in two ways. As expected, the number of achievement-relevant self-features participants generated reliably increased as a monotonic function of their levels of achievement schematicity; a parallel relation was found linking the number of affiliationrelevant features and affiliation schematicity (DeSteno, 1996) . As a second measure of accessibility, we examined the category of the first feature generated by members of the two schematicity groups. As predicted, achievementrelevant features proved to be more accessible than affiliation-relevant ones for members of the achievement group, with the opposite pattern holding among members of the affiliation group (DeSteno, 1996) .
As an implicit measure of feature organization (cf. Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) , we calculated adjusted ratio of clustering (ARC) scores (Murphy & Puff, 1982; Roenker, Thompson, & Brown, 1971 ) for participants' achievement and affiliation self-features, respectively. ARC scores index the association of items of information in memory as a function of their within-category clustering in recall. Importantly, this organizational measure is adjusted for the number of categories used and the number of items generated in each respondent's recall list. ARC scores, therefore, are orthogonal to the number of items generated in each category on any recall trial and, consequently, provide a measure of association independent of the total number of items generated. This methodological benefit satisfied a necessary condition; in the present experiment, each participant arrived with a unique set of selffeatures in memory.
To examine our prediction concerning differential levels of achievement-and affiliationrelevant feature organization among achievement and affiliation schematics, we compared participants' ARCachieve. and ARCamt, scores as a function of group membership. In accord with our predictions, participants' levels of schematicity moderated the degree of organization, or structure, among these two types of self-features (DeSteno, 1996) . For example, as illustrated in Figure 1 , greater affiliation schematicity resulted in increasing levels of association among affiliation-relevant self-features, as compared to achievement-relevant self-features, in individuals' working self-concepts.
We also collected data that provided us with a second measure of organization. Participants in each of the two groups rated a series of 31 personality traits for self-descriptiveness; these ratings were subsequently converted into two 31 × 31 dissimilarity matrices (DeSteno, 1996) . Elements of each matrix provided an index of association, or co-occurrence, among these descriptors; they did not reflect mean levels of endorsement. For example, the matrix element for two descriptors was small if they had similar levels of self-descriptiveness; that is, the descriptors were viewed as associated if they both were highly, moderately, or not at all descriptive, respectively.
We subjected these two matrices to an INDSCAL analysis and selected a two-dimensional solution for interpretation. INDSCAL is one of many multidimensional scaling algorithms designed to uncover the latent dimensions individuals use to determine the associations, or organization, among a set of stimuli. Using a similar analysis, Rosenberg et al. (1968) found that the associations among personality descriptors could be parsimoniously explained by their variation along two dimensions quite similar to achievement and affiliation relevance: intellectual/professional ability and social desirability. Consequently, we expected that the two dimensions recovered in our I N D S C A L solution were related to achievement and affiliation themes. We obtained empirical verification of this expectation through a series of regression analyses using normative ratings of the achievement and affiliation relevance of the descriptors (DeSteno, 1996) . l Figure 2 presents the acrossgroup scaling solution with labeled dimensions; the distance between any two points estimates their perceived similarity.
As opposed to m a n y other types of multidimensional scaling, I N D S C A L provides differential weightings of the importance of each dimension with respect to each input matrix; therefore, we were able to examine the differential dimension usages of the affiliation and achievement groups. In accord with the flexible structure model of the self-concept, we expected that achievement-and affiliation-schematic participants would organize the descriptors in different ways as a function of the type of self-theory they held. That is, they would perceive the similarity, or co-occurrence, of descriptors differently. Within the scaling solution, this would be represented by a differential weighting of the dimensions; application of these weights rescales the interpoint distances in the solution, thereby depicting the different 1One might wonder about the relation of this two dimensional solution to the common five-factor model thought to underlie the covariation of personality traits. For example, why were only two dimensions retained, or no rotations attempted? As one reviewer suggested, a 45 ° rotation might result in two dimensions similar to the Big Five dimensions of conscientiousness and neuroticism. In response to such inquiries, we were not surprised that a satisfactory solution (as determined by model fit and interpreatbility) was obtained with less than five dimensions; the dimensionality of multidimensional scaling (MDS) solutions usually is lower than factor analytic solutions for similar data (Arabie, Carroll, & DeSarbo, 1987; Kruskal & Wish, 1978) . Additionally, rotation is not allowable for INDSCAL solutions due to the normalization and structuring of the configuration across experimental groups. We do, however, believe that the regression techniques used to identify empirically the nature of the dimensions clearly shows their relations to the given labels (see DeSteno, 1996) ; these analyses use normative information concerning the relevance of all points to each dimension, as opposed to relying on a few polarized points for dimension identification. groups' perceptions of trait associations (Arabie, Carroll, & DeSarbo, 1987; Kruskal & Wish, 1978) . As predicted, the INDSCAL dimension weights revealed that achievement schematics primarily used the achievement-relevance dimension to determine feature associations, but affiliation schematics primarily used the affiliation-relevance dimension (DeSteno, 1996) . This can be understood visually as rescaling the solution by collapsing the opposing dimension. For example, take the feature triad intelligent, tense, affectionate. Because achievement schematics primarily used the achievement dimension, horizontal distances in the configuration (corresponding to affiliation relevance) collapse, leaving the features intelligent and tense in close proximity. Affiliation schematics, however, primarily used the affiliation dimension. To interpret their perceptions of feature relations, the vertical dimension is collapsed, leaving intelligent close to affectionate. In this way it is easy to see how each of the two groups organized features with respect to different schemas or frames. Importantly, support for the differential descriptor associations derived from the scaling solution using alternative measures of trait associations have also been found (DeSteno, 1996) .
The findings reported here provide clear support for the first prediction of the flexible structure model of the self-concept and have been replicated in subsequent experiments (DeSteno, 1996; DeSteno & Salovey, 1997) . Verification of this prediction is exceedingly important, for it implies not only that all self-features are not equally associated, but also that different individuals use alternative criteria for determining feature associations. Moreover, because association occurs to differing degrees among distinct types of features, the importance of domain specificity in charting the structure of the self-concept is evident. Failure to consider such specificity, we speculate, may account for previous difficulties in demonstrating links among self-features (e.g., Higgins et al., 1988) .
Flexibility in the Structure of the Self-Concept
Demonstrating chronic differences in the accessibility and organization of distinct types • of features residing in individuals' self-concepts was an important first test for the flexible structure model. However, as its name implies, the most central prediction made by this model is that the organization of self-features in the working self-concept should show intraindividual flexibility in response to context. That is, the levels of association among features are expected to change in response to motivationally or situationally induced alterations in schema dominance. For example, if an individual suddenly is cued to reflect on him-or herself as a member of a stereotyped racial group, as opposed to his or her chronic mode of reflection (e.g., professional identification), feature associations in the working self-concept should shift to reflect primarily the interrelations congruent with that stereotype.
To examine the validity of this prediction, an experiment following virtually the same protocol outlined in the previous section was conducted. Once again, achievement and affiliation schematics were used, and once again the predicted interindividual differences in the chronic levels of organization and accessibility with respect to achievement-and affiliationrelevant self-features were found (DeSteno, 1996, Study 2) . This second study, however, included an additional manipulation designed to examine the predicted structural dynamism of the self-concept. To this end, all participants wrote a short essay about an event in their lives that they considered to be an achievement; the author reasoned that having participants reflect on a past achievement would increase the dominance of an achievement schema in those who were not chronically high in achievement motivation (i.e., affiliation schematics). Participants were given 7 minutes to complete this task and were instructed to be as vivid in description as possible. Upon finishing the essay, participants again completed the spontaneous selfdescription measure.
In accord with predictions derived from the flexible structure model, it was found that the organization of features in the self-concept is indeed dynamic. As depicted in Figure 3 , inspection of participants' pre-and postprime ARCachieve. scores revealed the expected interaction. The organization of achievement-relevant features increased following the priming of an achievement schema for affiliation schematics; no reliable change in the organization of achievement features resulted for achievement schematics because they chronically use an achievement schema for organizing selffeatures. Thus, the self-concepts of affiliation schematics came to be more tightly organized around achievement themes in response to a situational press and thereby demonstrated that the structure, not only the content, of the working self-concept is malleable (DeSteno, 1996) .
Another experiment investigating the flexible structure of the self examined the influence of emotional states on self-concept structure. A plethora of research has shown that moods and emotions reliably influence many cognitive processes, both automatic and motivated (for a recent review, see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994) . However, although many researchers have argued that differences in the representational form of self-knowledge influence both canonical and pathological emotional experiences (e.g., Linville, 1985; Segal, 1988; Showers, 1992) , little work has focused on the reciprocal causal relation. Given evidence both that moods affect categorization (Halberstadt & Niedenthal, 1997) and that there is a link between self-knowledge organization and mood (Linville, 1985; Segal, 1988; Showers, 1992) , we decided to examine the possibility that emotional states influence the structure of the working self-concept (DeSteno & Salovey, 1997) .
In a study that is germane to the present question, Halberstadt and Niedenthal (1997) demonstrated that the presence of a positive or negative mood influenced the perceived relations among objects. That is, happy and sad individuals' perceptions of the associations among a series of faces relied to a greater degree on the hedonic characteristics of these faces (i.e., emotional expressions) than did the perceptions of individuals not experiencing a moderate level of affect. Halberstadt and Niedenthal (1997) presented several replications of this finding and argued that it resulted from happy o~ ~6 and sad individuals' constraining of similarity, and therefore categorization, primarily to the valence dimension.
We believed that the presence of a mood state might similarly affect the organization of self-features. That is, we suspected that an elevated happy or sad mood might cause the associations among self-features to be determined with respect to their valence, as opposed to other criteria (e.g., achievement or affiliation relevance). To examine this hypothesis, we asked individuals experiencing a happy, sad, or non-elevated mood state (i.e., control group), to rate a series of traits for their self-descriptiveness. These ratings were then subjected to an INDSCAL analysis similar to the one described in the previous section.
In accord with our predictions, we found different configurations to be necessary to explain trait associations among the different groups (DeSteno & Salovey, 1997) . For the control group, we found that the associations among the traits could be predominantly explained by two primary dimensions: achievement and affiliation relevance. This configuration, however, did not explain trait associations for individuals experiencing happy and sad moods. Trait relations for these individuals were primarily determined by a generalized valence dimension. Thus, in accord with our expectations, the presence of a mood state caused a reorganization of trait associations along a general hedonic dimension; traits became associated not by their relevance to achievement or affiliation criteria, but simply by their hedonic tone.
In sum, these findings provide initial evidence that self-knowledge is organized according to specific schemas or frames that vary in dominance both inter-and intrapersonally. Importantly, we have demonstrated differences in the levels of organization of discrete types of self-features and shown this organization to be flexible. Consequently, we believe that there is good reason to view the self-concept as a structure in working memory whose contents and organization exhibit a context-sensitive dynamism. More research is needed, however, to investigate further the form of this flexible structure, and in so doing, explicate its relations to the many other psychological phenomena that involve the phenomenological experience of self.
Concluding Remarks
We believe that the flexible structure model of the self-concept holds promise as a representational model of self-knowledge. It readily accommodates much of the known findings regarding both inter-and intraindividual differences in the experience of self. Importantly, however, it makes intriguing new predictions regarding the dynamic organization of selffeatures. The self-concept, we assert, is reconstructed in working memory according to different frames or schemas that gain ascendancy either through motivated thought or situational cueing. These organizational changes, moreover, greatly affect the experience of self by influencing the associations among selffeatures that, consequently, influence these features' conditional accessibilities. One's selfconcept, therefore, comes to cohere around one's currently dominant schema(s), resulting in a flood of schema-relevant features in awareness and a consequent experience of self shaped by the associated themes and expectations. This fluid organization of the self-concept readily explains individuals' plastic views of self. Such dynamism, however, also holds important consequences for many other psychological processes that invoke the self-concept. Depending upon which schemas one uses, the activations and relations among self-features will vary, resulting not only in different acute experiences of self (cf. Hinkley & Andersen, 1996; McGuire & McGuire, 1988) , but also in different self-categorizations (cf. Brewer, 1991; Turner, 1987) , social comparisons (cf. Dunning & Hayes, 1996) , and emotional experiences (Linville, 1985; Showers, 1992) ; each schema acts as a distinct lens that refocuses attention on different items of self-knowledge and sheds light on their different types of associations.
Finally, discovering the nature of the schemas or frames that each person holds promises even more usefulness in charting changes in the experience of self. This task, however, may be complicated by the fact that many schemas may be implicit; individuals may not be aware of the associations they are making or why they make them. Nonetheless, these schemas provide incisive windows not only into idiosyncratic views of the self, but also cultural world views of personhood. Uncovering how and why features are preceived to be related in differing societies may greatly enhance to understand cultural differences in the self (cf. Markus & Kitayama, 1991) , but may necessitate engagement in episodes of ethonographic data collection, or "thick description" (cf. Geertz, 1973; Ryle, 1971 ) in order to be successful.
Endeavors such as these will, we feel, greatly facilitate both knowledge of the nature of the self-concept and the ability to aid those experiencing troubling emotional responses tied to their senses of self. To understand the form and function of the self-concept is to understand the essence of each of us. It is to understand what makes individuals who they are and drives them to change, and it is to understand why one describes herself as, for example, "intelligent, Latina, and shy" as opposed to "tall, honest, and agile," even though each of the latter three attributes fit and reside in memory. The flexible structure model, we believe, provides a new way to study such phenomena, and thereby, offers a promising model for charting the dynamic concept that is the self.
